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Abstract 
The scope of uniformity of seaborne cargo regimes under the UN’s conventional approach seems 
to be more extensive than is desirable. The new business pattern of shipping subsectors, the 
rising influence of developing countries, and containerisation, are creating new shipping 
environments. These environments show that imperfect competition is only found in parts of the 
shipping markets nowadays, unlike that in/under the conventional approach to uniformity. 
Thus, these new economic and political realities call for innovative modifications to the 
conventional approach and a refocusing of international uniformity towards a limited degree of 
restriction [limited number of restrictions] of freedom of contract in legal shipping regimes. 
 
I. Introduction 
The international shipping market was unified before 1870.1 Since 1870, the 
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unified shipping market has broken up into two important sub-sectors, liner and 
tramp shipping, gradually adapting to the two main types of needs in cargo flows. 
Cargo liners operate on regular scheduled services; they are versatile, multi-deck 
vessels with installed cargo-handling cranes or gear, carrying mostly finished or 
semi-finished manufactured goods, often accompanied by refrigerated products, 
together with some bulk cargo.2 The tramp/bulk sector primarily handles two 
categories of bulk cargoes: dry bulk cargoes (e.g. ore, bauxite, coal, phosphates, 
and grain) by tramp vessels, and wet bulk cargo (e.g. oil or oil products) by 
specialised vessels.3 In the subsequent century up to the 1970s, liner and tramp 
shipping continued to be run more or less on the same pattern, and thus many 
vessels were interchangeable between liner and bulk sectors.4 
II. The significant transformation in international shipping 
markets over the past 50 years 
II.A Interchangeability between Liners and Tramp Vessels before the 1940s 
The distinction between cargo needs and shipping patterns among the two 
sectors between the 1870s and the 1970s can be further divided into two sub-
periods.5 Besides the general effects of globalisation on the two sub-sectors, the 
markets for both sectors reflect their own specific characteristics (e.g. entry and 
exit of carrier companies, and the information between carriers and the cargo 
interests).  They function as the market place both for ship owners seeking cargo 
spaces to fulfil transport services and assignments, and for the cargo interests, as 
                                                                                                                                
comments for this article. 
1 Gelina Harlaftis and Ioannis Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth 
Century: Continuity and Change’ in Costas Th. Grammenos (ed), The Handbook of 
Maritime Economics and Business (2nd edn, Informa, 2010), 8. 
2 Richard Scott , Greenwich Maritime Institute, ‘A Magnificent Transformation: 
World Shipping 50 Years Ago and Today’, 12 September2013. 
3 Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 7-8. 
4 Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 8-12. 
5 Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 7-12. Cf. Richard Scott who has profound shipping 
practical experience points out some counterexamples contradicting Harlaftis and 
Theotokas’s theoretical models in his conversation with the Author. 
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well as new entrant carriers when they decide to enter the shipping market. These 
players’ activities increased the liquidity of the oceanborne transport service 
markets, and thus they ensured better allocation of vessels (cargo spaces) to 
different routes, among shipowners or liner conferences, servicing international 
seaborne trade (See Figures 1 and 2). 
During the first sub-period, from the 1870s to the 1940s (see Figure 1), tramps 
and liners were similar in size and specification, and their roles were often 
interchangeable. Cargoes carried by liner and tramp shipping were not always 
absolutely defined: liner ships could carry tramp cargoes, and vice versa.6 
However, although these two sectors could substitute for each other, their main 
structures were diametrically different: oligopoly and protectionism within the 
liner sector (e.g. liner conferences from the 1870s to the 1970s),7 and virtually 
perfect competition in the tramp sector.8 The Hague Rules (1924) originated 
from this period, in which the tramps and liners were interchangeable substitutes. 
Thus, these Rules did not give proper consideration to the unprecedented 
changes after the 1940s.  
 
Figure 1: Shipping Markets during the 1870s-1940s (The 
Interchangeability between the liner and bulk sectors)
9
 
                                                        
6 Scott, ‘A Magnificent Transformation: World Shipping 50 Years Ago and Today’ . 
7 See the previous section on “Liner Shipping Sector with Anti-competitive Practices”. 
8 Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 8, 17-18, (stating that tramp shipping involves traditional 
maritime powers as carriers and economically powerful international companies, 
such as oil companies. Tramp shipping is under virtually perfect competition, for 
example Norwegian tramps. See details on tramps in e.g. Stig Tenold, Crisis? What 
Crisis?: the Expansion of Norwegian Shipping in the Interwar Period, 2005(illustrating that 
Norway as a traditional shipping power has become a major tramps shipping 
country since the 1920s and been subject to perfect competition). 
9 Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 9. D. K. Ryoo and H. A. Thanopoulou, ‘Liner Alliances in 
the Globalization Era: a Strategic Tool for Asian Container Carriers’ (1999) 26 
Maritime Policy & Management 349–367. 
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Figure drawn up by the author. 
II.B. Transformation: the clear division (non-interchangeability) between liners and 
tramps after the 1940s  
The second sub-period which the international shipping markets experienced was 
from the 1940s to the 1970s (see Figure 2). The 1970s was another period of 
revolutionary developments for the liner industry. Introduced in the 1960s, 
containers became widely used in the 1970s, as a means of unitisation of cargoes, 
and they revolutionised the transport system for industrial goods.10 
 
                                                        
10 Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 7. 
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Figure 2: Shipping Markets during the 1940s-1970s
11
 
 
Figure drawn up by the author. 
Unlike the structure of the shipping market in the first sub-period, liners and 
tramps have become clearly divided since the 1940s. The unprecedented increase 
in world production and international trade after World War II led to a gradual 
decrease in substitution between these two sectors.12 In bulk/tramp shipping, 
both the categories and the volume of cargoes were unprecedented. Wet/liquid 
bulk cargoes (oil and oil-made products) were introduced on a massive scale into 
                                                        
11 Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 9. Ryoo and Thanopoulou, ‘Liner Alliances in the 
Globalization Era: a Strategic Tool for Asian Container Carriers’ . 
12 For more details on the substitution relationship of the liner with the tramp, refer to 
Basil N. Metaxas, The Economics of Tramp Shipping (2nd edn,  Athlone Press ,1971), 
111-116. 
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the bulk cargo market, and huge tankers were built. Dry bulk cargoes nurtured 
specialised bulk cargo markets (e.g. coal, ore of bauxite and phosphates, 
fertilisers, and grain), and specialised ships were constructed to carry these bulk 
cargoes. On the other hand, in liner shipping, although liner conferences faced 
increased competition (e.g. from developing and socialist countries), their anti-
competitive markets continued to develop along the same pattern of oligopoly as 
before World War II.13 
III. Increasing containerisation and transformation of pattern of 
business of shipping companies 
III.A. Increasing containerisation 
Containerisation significantly boosted the further development of liner carriers.14 
According to UNCTAD (see Figure 3), goods have been increasingly carried 
within containers since the 1970s.15 First, it has made different goods more 
homogenous owing to the same packaging in containers. Second, 
containerisation has speeded up the time for loading and uploading, which has 
made regular scheduled services of liners possible. Unfortunately, the importance 
of containerisation had been considered neither by the Hague Rules (1924), nor 
the Visby Rules (1968). Although the Hamburg Rules (1978) were concluded 
after this change, these Rules were not widely ratified. 
                                                        
13 Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 8-12. 
14 Marc Levinson, The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the 
World Economy Bigger (Princeton University Press, 2010).  
15 Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 8-12. 
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Figure 3: International Seaborne Trade for Selected Decades (tonnes 
and percentage of tonnage)
16
 
 
Figure drawn up by the author. 
 
Contained and other cargoes (break bulk) were calculated as one category 
statistically in the UNCTAD sources cited, so the author cannot identify the 
accurate percentages of the containerised cargoes. However, according to the 
                                                        
16
 See data and chart of 2008 in Jan Hoffmann and Shashi Kumar, Chapter 2: 
‘Globalisation - the Maritime Nexus’, in Costas Th. Grammenos (ed), The 
Handbook of Maritime Economics and Business (2nd edn, Informa 2010), 
39.Source: Jan Hoffmann and Shashi Kumar, based on data from the UNCTAD 
Review of Maritime Transport (2009). See data and charts of 2008 in Jan 
Hoffmann and Shashi Kumar, Chapter 2: ‘Globalisation - the Maritime Nexus’, in 
Grammenos, The Handbook of Maritime Economics and Business , 39. Source: 
UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport (2009). 
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author’s conversation with Richard Scott who practices shipping business for 
over 30 years, the percentage of containerised cargoes within this category is 
increasing decade by decade, compared with the decreasing percentage of break 
bulk. In short, now containerised cargoes account for a substantial percentage in 
the liner shipping sector. 
II.B. Clear different business patterns of shipping companies: liners and tramps 
Containerisation17  also boosted new designs of vessels and cargo-handling 
infrastructure, global door-to-door transport (i.e. multimodal transport), early use 
of information technology, and structural changes in shipping markets. 18 In 
order to meet customers’ needs to operate worldwide, containerisation and liner 
companies’ concentration led to a fundamental transformation of liner shipping 
companies into the archetype of a globalised transnational shipping company. 
 In order to meet the new needs created by containerisation, liner companies 
started to establish their global logistics networks from the 1970s onwards.19 
Their worldwide coverage was achieved through the formation of alliances and 
transnational megamergers.20 On the one hand, the formation of global alliances 
or mergers fulfilled the aim of geographical worldwide coverage. For instance, as 
previously mentioned, the Grand Alliance had as its members Hapag-Lloyd, 
NYK, NOL, and P&O in 1995; later, MISC entered this Alliance while NOL left 
to enter the New World Alliance; recently MISC withdrew and the Grand 
Alliance now consists of Hapag-Lloyd (Germany, 5th), NYK (Japan, 12th), and 
OOCL (HK, 11th) (See Appendix: Table on Top 20 Liner Shipping 
Companies).21 
On the other hand, large liner shipping companies built their global networks by 
                                                        
17 Containerised trade has become a significant factor in the international shipping 
industry, with an average annual growth rate of nearly ten per cent (global container 
trade was estimated at 137 million TEUs in the 1990s). UNCTAD, Review of Maritime 
Transport 2009, (UNCTAD, Geneva, 2009). 
18 More details of analysis in  Frank Broeze, The Globalisation of the Oceans, 
Containerisation from the 1950s to the Present (International Maritime Economic History 
Association, 2002), 160. 
19 Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 8-12. 
20 Broeze, The Globalisation of the Oceans, Containerisation from the 1950s to the Present . 
21 The Grand Alliance, http://www.grandalliance.com/, accessed 23 September 2013. 
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transnational concentration. For instance, as mentioned above, the three major 
mergers and acquisitions in the 1990s were: P&O (UK) with Nedlloyd 
(Netherlands), Maersk (Denmark) with Sea Land (US), and Neptune Orient Line 
(Singapore) with American President Lines (US).22 Consequently, the 
enlargement of these liner companies and their alliances nurtured strategic 
alliances; their relationships evolved from past competitors towards a number of 
new forms of cooperation (alliances/consortia and international megamergers) in 
the globalisation era.23 
By using these two methods of cooperation (alliances and transnational 
megamergers), a number of large liner shipping companies now have global 
networks and can provide global services for their clients through overseas hubs 
and transnational networks.24 These large liner companies handle the global 
services, but small liner companies deal with the regional network.25 
Consequently, the relationship between the large and small liner companies is not 
one of absolute competition but complementation (cooperation). 
Figure 4: Globalised Liner Market (1970 - )
26
 
                                                        
22 WTO, S/C/W/315, 14, 16, paragraphs 36 and 43. Cf. before the 1980s, mergers 
and acquisitions mainly took place within national borders and remained confined to 
the liner sector, but hitherto the bulk sector is traditionally less heavily concentrated 
because it is frequently organized on the basis of one-ship companies.  
23 Ryoo and Thanopoulou, ‘Liner Alliances in the Globalization Era: a Strategic Tool 
for Asian Container Carriers’ .  
24 WTO Doc. S/C/W/315, 15, paragraph 39. 
25 Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 11. 
26 Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 10. Broeze, The Globalisation of the Oceans, Containerisation 
from the 1950s to the Present , 138-139. 
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Figure drawn up by the author. 
In contrast, tramp shipping did not experience such a large degree of innovative 
technical developments as the liner sector, and no significant transformation 
occurred in the structure of markets or the organisation of tramp companies.27 
Although specialised vessels, such as tankers have been built for the tramp 
shipping (see Table 4), the general pattern of tramp companies has not changed 
significantly over the past one hundred years.28 The size of many tramp 
companies has not changed much.29 For instance, a tramp company may own 
either a number of tramps or a single vessel. However, some companies have 
become significantly larger. Secondly, the relationship of tramp members within 
the same network is competition on the basis of cost, unlike the cooperation 
                                                        
27 Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 11. 
28 WTO, S/C/W/315, 14, paragraph 38 (stating that the share of capacity of the top 
twenty liner operators increased from 48 percent in 1998 to 69 percent in 2009. 
29 Richard Scott, experienced global shipping market analyst, mentioned to the author 
that there were some large tramp shipping companies. 
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within the liner sector.30 
Globalised tramp/bulk shipping today operates to a much less globalised extent 
than the liner sector. Globalised bulk shipping is based on national networks, 
including trust, and common national or family cultures. Tramp companies 
establish multinational networks on the basis of the common national cultures of 
traditional maritime countries, such as the UK, Greece, Norway, and Japan (see 
Figure 5).31 
Unlike cooperation by liner companies, tramps compete with one another even 
as members of the same network. Regardless of the size of tramp companies, 
their organisation, structure and strategies are similar, and they compete on the 
basis of cost.32 Hence, liners run at both regional and global levels, but tramps are 
almost always run at regional levels.33 Therefore, global uniform rules on 
seaborne cargo regime should focus mainly on the globalised liner business rather 
than regional-based tramps. 
 
Figure 5: Globalised Bulk Shipping - Sum of National Networks
34
 
                                                        
30 Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 12. 
31 Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 8-12. 
32 Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 12. 
33 Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 8-12. 
34 Cf. Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 10. A similar figure was named “regional markets in the 
bulk shipping”, but the word “regional” is a misleading or inaccurate, because the 
bulk shipping market is run on globally scope. The bulk cargo industry culture is 
trust on the basis of “national networking” instead of regional networking. Sources: 
UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, 1998 and 2009. WTO Doc. S/C/W/315, 15, 
Table 7: Top 20 liner shipping companies (1997-2009). Broeze, The Globalisation of the 
Oceans, Containerisation from the 1950s to the Present, 138-139. 
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Figure drawn up by the author. 
 
IV. Abolition of anti-competition exemption following the 
1970s: increasingly competitive markets for doth tramps 
and liners 
Traditionally, the whole shipping sector was immune from competition law.35But 
the US Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA) 199836 challenged the special 
                                                        
35 Antōnios M Antapasēs, Lia I Athanassiou, and Erik Røsæg, Competition and Regulation 
in Shipping and Shipping Related Industries (Brill 2009), 7. 
36 See also US Federal Maritime Commission, The Impact of The Ocean Shipping 
Reform Act 1998, September 2001, 
http://www.fmc.gov/assets/1/Page/OSRA_Study.pdf, 
http://www.dartmaritime.com/Ocean%20Shipping%20Reform%20Act%20of%20
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treatment of liner conferences under American antitrust law, significantly 
diminishing the capacity of conferences to regulate their members. Ten years 
later, in October 2008, EC regulation 4056/86, which guaranteed conferences 
being exempt from EU competition law, was abolished.37 
Before October 2006 tramp shipping and cabotage38 were exempted from the 
legal regime established to implement the “Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union” (TFEU) Articles 101, 102 and 104 (previously numbered as 
EC Treaty Articles 81, 82 and 84); international liner conferences were 
historically immune from antitrust law.39 
The picture of regulations for international shipping is much more perplexing 
than that of other modes of transport. Since 1974, the UN “Convention on a 
Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences” (Liner Code) has granted antitrust 
exemptions to liner conferences.40 In 1979, EC Regulation 954/79 supported the 
EC Member States in ratifying the UN Liner Code.41 Finally the EC antitrust 
regime for international shipping provided Regulation 4056/86,42 which was 
                                                                                                                                
1998.html or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-105publ258/pdf/PLAW-
105publ258.pdf, accessed 27 April 2012.  
37 EC Regulation 4056/86. 
38 For example, in Norway, the relevant competition articles in the EEA Agreement 
are Articles 53 and 54 corresponding to Articles 85 and 86 in the EU Treaty, and 
EU Regulations 954/79 and 4056/86. See WTO, Communication From Norway, 
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.6/Supp.1, (23 March 1995), 1-2. In 1994 and 1995, the 
WTO Negotiating Groups on Maritime Transport Services conducted a 
comprehensive questionnaire among participants and observers; in the end, the 
participating countries and the Group provided as much information as they could 
on bulk shipping, liner shipping and multimodal transport. See WTO - NGMTS, 
‘NOTE ON THE MEETING OF 13 JULY 1994’, 1994 (4 August 1994), 2 
(pointing out that the WTO NGMTS conducted this questionnaire on the economic 
structure of the shipping sector, including trade flows, and on regulatory structures). 
WTO, Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services, Doc. S/NGMTS/W/2, (21 
October 1994). WTO - NGMTS, ‘NOTE ON THE MEETING OF 13 AND 16 
FEBRUARY 1996’, 1996, Doc. S/NGMTS/W/9, (8 March 1996).  
39 Antapasēs, Athanassiou, and Røsæg, Competition and Regulation in Shipping and Shipping 
Related Industries, 7. 
40 UNCTAD, ‘Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences (Geneva, 6 
April 1974)’, no date, 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XII-
6&chapter=12&lang=en , accessed 18 June 2013. 
41 Council Regulation (EC) [1979]OJ  L121/1. 
42 Council Regulation (EC) [1986]OJ L378/5. 
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consistent with the UN Liner Code, prescribed a special antitrust regime for liner 
shipping and established a block exemption for liner conferences (e.g. price-
fixing cartels) without time limitation.43 
In 2006, the EC implemented a different maritime policy by reconsideration of 
the application of competition rules to shipping, again through the enactment of 
EU Regulation 1419/2006.44 Since October 2006, tramp shipping and cabotage 
have been covered by EU Regulation 1/2003, subject to competition rules under 
TFEU Article 101 and 102 (former Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty); on 18 
October 2008, the exemptions of liner conferences were abolished through EU 
Regulation 1490/2007.45 Thereafter, all joint price fixing activity for services to or 
from the EU has been illegal. Whereas elsewhere liner conferences are authorised 
under limited, increasingly strict, anti-competitive exemptions, the EU is the only 
jurisdiction, until now, in which liner conferences have been prohibited.46 
These waves of abolition of monopolistic exemptions made the tramp and liner 
sectors differ further from their counterparts at the times of the Hague Rules 
(1924), Visby Rules (1968, and 1979), and Hamburg Rules (1978). The shipping 
markets are evolving toward more competitiveness, and thus the scope of 
uniformity should be smaller, rather than larger as under the Rotterdam Rules 
(2008).  
V. Rising influences of non-traditional maritime countries in 
world shipping markets with political implications  
As seen in UNCTAD data, a significant number of vessels are registered in 
countries with an open registry policy, 47 such as Panama and Liberia. 48 On the 
                                                        
43 Council Regulation (EC) [1986]OJ L378/5. 
44 Council Regulation (EC) No 1419/2006 of 25 September 2006 repealing Regulation 
(EEC) No 4056/86 laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles 85 and 
86 of the EC Treaty to maritime transport, and amending Regulation (EC) No 
1/2003 as regards the extension of its scope to include cabotage and international 
tramp services [2006] OJ L269/1.   
45 Council Regulation (EC) [2007]OJ L 332/1. 
46 WTO, ‘MARITIME TRANSPORT SERVICES: Background Note by the 
Secretariat’, 2010 , Doc. S/C/W/315, (7 June 2010), 23-24, paragraphs 76 and 78. 
47 UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2008, (Geneva, 2008), Figure: True 
Nationality of Major Shipping Powers under Open Registry (Ownership or 
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basis of the true nationality of vessels, a fleet recorded as being owned and 
controlled (beneficially owned) by a particular country is comprised of ships 
owned by companies or individuals which are, or who are, nationals of that 
country. These could be state-owned in some countries, or they could be 
privately owned: both forms of ownership are included. In many new trading and 
developing countries, ship-owners are inclined to register their ship in their home 
countries. For example, the largest nationally controlled merchant fleets which 
are also registered under the national flags include oil tankers from Kuwait, 
Brazil, India and Thailand, dry bulk cargoes carriers from Hong Kong (China), 
India, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam and the Republic of Korea, and general cargo 
ships from Indonesia, Russia, and Thailand.49 However, there is a precipitous 
decline reflected in the shipping fleets registered in developed countries, most of 
which also fall within the traditional maritime powers category. Hoffmann argues 
that nowadays four out of every five merchant ships are registered either under 
an open registry flag or in a developing country, and ship-owners from developed 
countries are more likely to choose a foreign flag than those from countries with 
a lower GDP per capita.50 Alternatively, some ship-owners chose second 
registers of traditional maritime countries. 
 
Table 1: The Largest Fleets of the 20
th
 Century (Fleets in Millions of 
Gross Registered Tonnage)
51
 
Country/Territory 1914 1937 1963 1992 2008 
                                                                                                                                
Controlled under Open-registry Fleets). 
48 See True Nationality of Major Shipping Powers (Ownership or Controlled under 
Open-registry Fleets), as of 1 January 2012 (deadweight) in WTO Doc. 
S/C/W/315, 13, Table 6; UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, 2009. 
49 See UNCTAD, Maritime Transport Review (2008), 41. 
50 See Jan Hoffmann, Determinants of Vessel Flat, in Kevin Culliane, Shipping 
Economics, Research in Transportation Economics, (Volume 12, Elsevier, UK, 
2005). 
51 Sources: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 1914, Lloyd’s Statistical Tables 1990, 1992; 
Gelina Harlaftis, A History of Greek-owned Shipping, 1830 to the Present Day 
(Routledge, 1993), Table 6.3; UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport (2008). 
Geneva. Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 5, Table 1.  
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  grt % grt % grt % grt % grt % 
Great Britain (UK) 21.0 43% 20.6 31% 21.6 15% 23.6 3.4% 26.0 2.5% 
Germany 5.5 11% 3.9 6% 5.0   16.9 2.4% 94.2 9.1% 
USA 5.4 11% 12.4 18% 23.1 16% 59.1 8.5% 39.8 3.8% 
Norway 2.5 5% 4.3 6% 13.7 9% 54.1 7.8% 46.9 4.5% 
France 2.3 5% 2.8 4%   4% 7.0 1.0% 6.5 0.6% 
Japan 1.7 4% 4.5 7%   7% 90.2 12.3% 161.7 15.6% 
Italy 1.7 3% 3.2 5% 5.6 4% 11.7 1.7% 17.7 1.7% 
Netherlands(Holland
) 1.5 3% 2.6 4% 5.2 4%     8.6 0.8% 
Sweden 1.1 2% 1.5 2% 4.2   12.2 0.3% 6.9 0.7% 
Russia (USSR) 1.0 2% 1.3 2% 5.4 4% 19.2 2.8% 18.0 1.7% 
Spain 0.9 2% 1.0 1% 2.0   5.1 0.7% 4.5 0.4% 
Greece 0.8 2% 1.9 3% 15.0 10% 100.6 14.5% 174.6 16.8% 
Hong Kong     0.3   0.8   31.6 4.5% 33.4 3.2% 
China     0.6   0.5   27.5 3.9% 84.9 8.2% 
Republic of Korea          0.1   18.2 2.6% 37.7 3.6% 
Above-listed total 45.4 93% 60.9 89% 102.2 73% 477.0 66.4% 761.4 73.2% 
World total 49.1 100% 66.7 100% 145.9 100% 718.4 100% 1040.164 100% 
1. “grt” = “Gross Registered Tonnage”.   
2. 1992 and 2008 data include real ownership (or in control) including all registered 
flags. Data for 2008 include ships of 1000 grt and above.  
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3. The flag of convenience (open registry) was not widely used before the 1960s, and 
thus the data for 1914 and 1937 does not take into consideration registered tonnage 
under foreign flags.  
 
At the macro level (countries), up to the 1960s the main carriers of the world 
fleet remained the same with Great Britain and the US (which held a decreasing 
share in world shipping in the following decades), followed by the continual rise 
of Greece, Norway and Japan (see Table 5, 1963 columns). Flags of convenience 
(open registry) enabled the ship-owners of traditional maritime countries to 
maintain control of their fleets while benefiting from low-cost labour of open 
registered countries;52 after the 1980s, flags of convenience were extensively used 
by all western and eastern maritime countries.53 
The 1970s marked a new era, in which the European maritime countries (except 
Greece) lost their final pre-dominance in international shipping. In the 1990s and 
2000s, Greece ranked in the first position, and Japan has remained steadily in the 
second position (Table 5, 1992 and 2008 columns). In the 1990s, the rise of new 
maritime territories from Asia was evident;54 in the 1990s and 2000s, China, 
Taiwan (China), Hong Kong (China), and the Republic of Korea became 
noticeable competitors to their European counterparts (see Table 5 and its 1992 
columns, and Tables on top liner and bulk carriers including Asian carrier 
companies in the Appendix). 
At the micro level (carrier companies), the trend towards transnational 
concentration also resulted in a major reshuffle in the ranking of the leading 
ocean shipping liner companies and the increasing size of vessels.55 For example, 
P&O Nedlloyd (3rd in 1997, UK/Netherlands), Sea Land (4th 1997, US), CP 
Ships (16th in 1997, Canada) and American President Line (18th in 1997, US) have 
been overtaken by their competitors and disappeared from the 2009 rankings; 
                                                        
52 Gunnar K. Sletmo, ‘Shipping’s Fourth Wave: Ship Management and Vernon's 
Trade Cycles’ (1989) 16 Maritime Policy & Management 293–303.  
53 Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 7. 
54 Harlaftis and Theotokas, ‘Maritime Business during the Twentieth Century: 
Continuity and Change’ , 7-8. 
55 WTO Doc. S/C/W/315, 15, paragraphs 39-40 and Table 7 Top 20 liner shipping 
companies (1997-2009). The fact that the growth rate of overall capacity exceeds 
that of the number of vessels for the two 20 liner companies indicates the size of 
vessels increased. 
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Cho Yang (20th in 1997, the Republic of Korea) went bankrupt and also 
disappeared from the rankings.56 
 
Figure 6: Traditional Maritime Powers and Their Maritime Levels of 
Engagement on 1 January 200957 
 
Figure dawn by the author; dwt = deadweight tonnage. 
 
                                                        
56 See details in WTO, S/C/W/315, 16, footnote 21 with reference to Table 7. 
57 Source: UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2010, (UNCTAD, Geneva, 
2010), Table 3.6, 70. Data from the UNCTAD for 2011 are lacking in Review of 
Maritime Transport 2011, but see also the former date of 2008 in Table 28, 
UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2009, (UNCTAD, Geneva, 2009), 83. 
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Figure 6 illustrates the maritime levels of engagement of traditional maritime 
nations on 1 January 2009. It is seen that all the traditional maritime powers, 
except Germany and Japan, have a greater share of world trade in value than 
their percentage share of world fleet in deadweight (Figure 6). Compared with 
the rankings in 2008, those of UK and Italy are reversed.58 
In the negotiating decades of the Hague Rules, developed countries were more or 
less only representing the carriers’ interests. However, nowadays some developed 
countries, such as the US and Germany, represent the cargo interests as well as 
the carriers’ interests. As Mendelsohn points out, it is shipper interests alone that 
have effectively prevented the ratification of the Visby Rules in the US59, since 
the ratification of the Visby Rules would ultimately delay the ratification of the 
Hamburg Rules, favoured by the cargo interests. 
 
 
Figure 7 : Maritime Levels of Engagement of Newly-emerging Trade 
Countries and Territories on 1 January 2009
60
 
                                                        
58 UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2010, (UNCTAD, Geneva, 2010), Table 
3.6, 70; Review of Maritime Transport 2009, (UNCTAD, Geneva, 2009), Table 28, 
83. 
59 Allan I. Mendelsohn, ‘Why The U.S. Did Not Ratify The Visby Amendments’ 
(1992) 29 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 29–53, 30. 
60
 Source: UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport (2010). See UNCTAD, Table 
3.6, Review of Maritime Transport 2010, (UNCTAD, Geneva, 2010), 70. Data of 
2011 from the UNCTAD are absent in Review of Maritime Transport 2011, but see 
previous data of 2008 in UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2009, (Geneva, 
2009), 83, Table 28. 
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 1. “Dwt” = deadweight tonnage. 
2. “The country of ownership indicates where the true controlling interest (that is the 
parent company) of the fleet is located. In several cases, determining this has required 
several judgements [...]” 61 
Chart drawn by the author. 
 
However, Figure 7 indicates a contrary trend of development for the newly-
emerging trading nations: the majority of the ranked territories possess a higher 
percentage of owned fleets than their share of value in international commerce, 
and the only exceptions to the trend are India (which is 5th, and not far from the 
general principle with a slightly lower percentage of fleet ownership than that of 
trade) and the last three ranked territories, Thailand,62 Brazil and Malaysia.63 
                                                        
61 UNCTAD, Review  of Maritime Transport 2012, 41. 
62 UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2009 and 2010, (Geneva, 2009 and 
2010), Table 28.Thailand first became one of top 25 trading nations in 2009. 
63 UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2009 and 2010, (Geneva, 2009 and 
2010), Table 28. In addition, Brazil and Malaysia switched their rankings in 2009, 
compared to 2008. 
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In short, the commercial reality in world shipping today is markedly different 
from the times when the Hague and Hamburg Rules were negotiated. First, there 
is a significantly increasing number of shipping powers, mainly among the newly-
emerged and developed non-European countries (e.g. Japan, the US, the 
Republic of Korea, and China), but meanwhile it seems that the influence of 
traditional European shipping countries such as UK has shrunk (see Table 5 
above for the decreasing percentage of world fleet ownership). Secondly, the 
balance of power has clearly swung from the hull-dominated market to the cargo 
interests. The traditional maritime powers such as Great Britain have lost their 
supremacy in the shipping sector (see Table 5). Meanwhile, cargo interests have 
become more developed than they were in the 1920s, for example in the US, and 
China (see Figure 6, Table 1 and Appendix).64 
VI. Conclusion 
Government regulations in shipping have a long history (e.g. the US Harter Act 
of 1893),65 and they seem to expand their scope of application on uniform 
seaborne cargo rules. However, a rational set of uniform regimes of sea carriage 
rules in the future should adjust to the changing business pattern of shipping 
companies, legal competition policies and today’s new politically influential 
countries in shipping. Thus, this article looked at the new shipping realities from 
two perspectives. 
Firstly, from the micro-level perspective (shipping sectors and companies), three 
fundamental transformations in the past 50 years differ from what happened at 
the time of the Hague-Visby Rules negotiations. In terms of shipping companies, 
vessels had inter-changeability between liner and bulk sectors during the Hague-
Visby period. However, tramps and liners reduced their inter-changeability after 
the 1940s, and then they were clearly divided. Tramps and liners now carry 
different types of cargoes, and have different scales of business. The liner 
shipping companies have both global and local logistical networks. They also 
work as alliances (or consortia) or transnational megamergers, with both 
cooperative and competitive motives among individual liners. The scale of many, 
but not all, tramp companies remains similar to those of the Hague-Visby times: 
regional networks and non-cooperation between tramps. Therefore, the uniform 
                                                        
64 The US Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. §1701-1703. Shashi Kumar, The U.S. 
Shipping Act of 1984: A Scrutiny of Controversial Provisions (Castine, Marne 
Maritime Press, 1987);  
65 See Bruce Farthing, International Shipping: An Introduction to the Policies, Politics and 
Institutions of the Maritime World (2nd edn, Lloyd’s 1993), 21-25. 
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international sea regime should be limited in scope, focusing on globalised liner 
shipping realities rather than being further extended.  
The reasons for this transformation in international shipping markets are the 
increasing containerisation and the abolition of anti-competition exemptions for 
shipping companies after the 1970s. These changes have made the shipping 
market more globalised and more competitive, which is different from what 
happened at the time of the previous conventions. On the one hand, 
globalisation calls for uniform rules of sea carriage. On the other hand, abolition 
of anti-competition immunity of tramp and liner companies after the 1970s 
induced more competition than at the time of the Hague, Visby and Hamburg 
Rules. Competition in the shipping markets will bring about adjustment to freight 
rates and benefit cargo interests, and the need for mandatory rules within the 
international sea cargo uniform regimes will be reduced to a certain extent. 
Therefore, the scope of uniformity should be reduced, rather than increased 
under the Rotterdam Rules.  
Secondly, from the macro-perspective (countries or territories), the political 
balances in the next round of uniform sea carriage rules will also be significantly 
different from the previous conventions. Western countries lost their absolute 
authority when a global convention on uniform rules of sea cargo carriage was 
introduced. Today, the global “[c]argo geography does not exactly match carrier 
geography.”66 
In a potential, forthcoming round of negotiations on uniform sea carriage 
regimes, with reference to the different ratios between cargo and carriers and the 
generated volumes of international trade, the influential political and economic 
negotiators will be divided into three categories. The first group of countries or 
territories are those which generate and/or accept a large number of cargoes but 
do not own strong national-flag fleets or even control fleets proportional to the 
magnitude of their foreign trade (e.g. Canada, see Table 5).67 The second group 
are maritime powers without significant hinterlands which have historically 
developed a comparative advantage in international maritime transport (i.e. third-
party shipments, namely carriers which are not the producing or recipient 
country).68 These play a significant role in this category of countries, and they 
                                                        
66 WTO, ‘MARITIME TRANSPORT SERVICES: Background Note by the 
Secretariat’ , S/C/W/315, 11, paragraph 27. 
67 WTO, ‘MARITIME TRANSPORT SERVICES: Background Note by the 
Secretariat’ , S/C/W/315, 11, paragraph 27. 
68 They control fleets the capacity of which far exceeds their foreign trade volume. 
Greece and Norway (Tables 4 and 5) (as well as Demark) are typical of these 
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became new members of the hull interest groups after World War II; the Hague-
Visby regimes had not reflected their interests, and the new members of this 
category called for further amendments of current international uniform legal 
regimes for shipping. The third group lie between these two extremes mentioned 
above, and consist of numerous countries and territories which have a significant 
amount of international trade and also control fleets (or national-flag fleets) 
which are used not only for domestic trade, but also for overseas liner and bulk 
traffic (e.g. China and the US, see Appenxi). For cost reasons, controlled fleets 
may be registered under “open registries”, to use a euphemism, or “flags of 
convenience”, to use a more common, but pejorative term.69 
These three categories of countries will negotiate and bargain at the negotiating 
tables of the next uniform sea cargo regime. The political influence of these 
countries is now much greater than it was at the time when the western countries 
introduced the Hague and Visby Rules. Therefore, the conventional approach to 
uniformity should be modified to accommodate these newly-emerging countries 
or territories. 
 
Appendix: Shipping countries and shipping 
companies 
 
                                                                                                                                
countries; they represented the hull interests and had been highly engaged in the 
negotiation of the most influential current regimes under the Hague Rules (1924). In 
addition, Japan, Hong Kong (China), Singapore, and Taiwan (China) also belong to 
the second category, as shown in Appendix. See more in WTO, ‘MARITIME 
TRANSPORT SERVICES: Background Note by the Secretariat’ , S/C/W/315, 11, 
paragraph 27. 
69 Even though Panama, Liberia, Marshall Islands, and Chinese Hong Kong are the 
largest four flag (of registration) states (territories), they do not directly represent the 
hull interests (Tables 3 and 4). See more in WTO, ‘MARITIME TRANSPORT 
SERVICES: Background Note by the Secretariat’ , S/C/W/315, 11, 13, paragraph 
27, Table 6 True nationality of major open-registry fleets, as at 1 January 2009 
(number of ships). 
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Table 2: Top 20 Liner Shipping Companies (1997-2009)70 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Leading Bulk Cargo Shipping Lines (2007)71 
                                                        
70 UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport (UNCTAD/RMT/2012). 
71 UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport (UNCTAD/RMT/2012). 
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Table 4: Leading Bulk Cargo Shipping Lines (2007)
72
 
 
                                                        
72
 Source: ISEMAR/Le Marin, special issue, 31 October 2008, Shipping 2008: Les 
clés du transport maritime mondial. WTO Doc. S/C/W/315, 16, Table 8 Leaking 
bulk cargo shipping lines (2007); Source: ISEMAR/Le Marin, special issue, 31 
October 2008, Shipping 2008: Les clés du transport maritime mondial, 
<www.nxtbook.fr/lemarin/lemarin/DSSHIPPING081031/index.php#/0>, accessed 3 
March 2013. 
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 “LNG” = Liquefied Natural Gas.
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Table 5: Countries/territories of Ownership
73
                                                        
73 UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2012, p.42, Table 2.5. 
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Table 6: Table: The 35 leading maritime countries and territories (1996-2008)74 
 
                                                        
74 WTO, S/C/W/315, 11-12, paragraphs 28-30, Table 5 (these 35 countries control 
over 95 percent of the world fleet, half of which are developing countries; the 
ranking over 1996/2008 period remained more or less stable, because most listed 
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countries/territories move over two or so ranks); UNCTAD, Review of Maritime 
Transport,1997 and 2009. 
